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Testing for Speculative Behavior in US Corn Ethanol Investments 
 
1. Introduction 
US corn ethanol industry saw remarkable growth during 2000s. The installed 
capacity increased from 1.7 billion gallons in 1999 to 13 billion gallons in 2009 (figure 
1).
1 The installed capacity increased steadily due to growing (mandated) demand, initially 
due to low corn prices, and subsequently due to rising crude oil prices which resulted in 
higher ethanol profitability. Not withstanding these factors, the idled capacity jumped up 
in 2008-09 reaching as high as 3.2 billion gallons or 26% of the installed capacity due to 
rapid expansion in the installed capacity coupled with a sudden contraction of crude oil 
prices. The widespread expansion of installed capacity during 2004-08 followed by a 
large scale idling in 2008-09 raise two important questions about ethanol industry: 
whether the speculative pricing of crude oil contributed to speculative capacity addition 
in US corn ethanol industry? If so, how much of that installed capacity was actually 
warranted by the market factors and how much could be attributed to speculative 
investment?  
To answer these questions, the presence of speculative bubbles in corn ethanol 
investments must be checked. If a speculative bubble were present at industry level, the 
installed capacity may be divided into two components: (i) installed capacity that can be 
supported by market fundamentals, i.e. based on factors such as expected crude oil prices, 
corn input prices, processing costs and government support; and (ii) installed capacity 
that may be unwarranted by the market factors showing a systematic explosive pattern 
termed as speculative bubble (Flood and Garber, 1980).   
The speculative bubble considered here with respect to corn ethanol investment 
differs from speculation in crude oil prices. This study assumes speculation in crude oil 
prices pre-existed over the past decade (Eckaus, 2008; Hamilton, 2009). Moreover, 
relative differences in the size of crude oil and ethanol markets is such that ethanol prices 
did not have the ability to influence crude oil prices. Even if a speculative pricing bubble 
in crude oil prices did not exist, it would already be reflected in the market prices of 
ethanol because they are linked to crude oil prices based on energy content. Therefore, 
crude oil price speculation is not the focus of this study. It is speculative behavior with 
regard to added capacity of ethanol industry – that is affected by crude oil prices and of 
interest in this study.
2 The main objectives of this paper are to test for and quantify 
speculative activity in corn ethanol investment. 
This paper uses a rational expectations model (with perfect foresight) to study a 
system of supply, demand, inventory and price expectations for ethanol (Muth, 1961). 
Rational prices predicted using this system help determine the capacity of corn ethanol 
plants supported solely by market fundamental factors. Alternatively, the price 
expectation can be modified to include new variables which can potentially capture any 
speculative activity that underlay ethanol industry investments. These new variables are 
                                                 
1 with an average capacity utilization (defined as the ratio of actual production to installed capacity) of 
84%. The average capacity utilization reached a high of 93% in 2004, but has been declining steadily. In 
2008, it reached an all time low of 74% 
2 The ethanol industry may have expanded on the expectation (or speculation) that favorable market 
conditions – high crude oil prices, low corn (input) prices or both – would last very long in the future. Draft – Do not quote   
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computed based on the demand and supply parameters through cross equation restrictions 
as suggested in Flood and Garber (1980) and Sargent (1987).  
The speculative component, if any, is specified as the difference between capacity 
warranted by the market fundamentals and actual installed capacity. Testing for this 
residual speculative portion is an essential step to estimate speculative investment in corn 
ethanol industry. Flood and Garber suggested that there could be evidence for speculative 
behavior when either of the following two conditions are possible: 1) either the estimated 
coefficient associated with the new variable is statistically significant or 2) the new 
installed capacity attributed to speculative investment depicts a nonstationary (actually, 
explosive time series) pattern. Section 2 contains literature review on speculative 
bubbles, ways to apply it to ethanol investments and econometric estimation issues. 
Section 3 proposes three alternative approaches to test for speculation which also provide 
a means to compare results from different procedures.
3  
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2. Literature Review: 
A substantial rise and fall in prices (or unusually high volumes of trading by 
speculators) usually raises the suspicion of speculative behavior. Such speculative 
bubbles are often linked with booms and busts in stocks prices, financial asset prices, and 
exchange rates (Hong, et al., 2006; Wu, 1997). Among commodities, speculative bubbles 
are frequently associated with crude oil prices. The US Senate staff report (2006) found 
evidence for speculation in energy commodities in mid-2000s; other studies have also 
argued that the dramatic rise and fall in crude oil prices during 2008-09 might have 
speculative components (Eckaus, 2008; Hamilton, 2009). These studies, among others, 
present evidence for speculative activity in crude oil pricing, but their impact on corn 
ethanol investment is unknown. 
                                                 
3 Detailed empirical results are available from authors. Draft – Do not quote   
  4 
There is evidence that volatility and price movements spilled over from crude oil 
to agricultural commodities markets. Recently, Du, et al. (2009) found that crude oil price 
volatility spilled over into corn price volatility due to ‘tighter interconnection’ between 
energy and feedgrains markets with the large scale use of corn for ethanol production in 
the US. They also showed that there was a speculative component in crude oil pricing 
behavior. (Harri, et al., 2009) found weak evidence for long run cointegrating price 
relationships between crude oil prices, exchange rates and corn prices. Although these are 
pieces of evidence for crude oil price volatility spilling over to agricultural markets, Irwin 
et al (2009) argued that there was no speculation in agricultural commodities independent 
of crude oil markets. They suggested that price movements in agricultural commodities 
were simply a response to crude oil price movements and not a speculative behavior 
themselves. The implication of their results is that agricultural commodity prices were 
affected by crude oil prices, possibly including corn ethanol prices, but not vice-versa. 
Hence, crude oil prices will be one of the main factors to differentiate the investment 
arising out of speculative behavior from that supported by the market fundamentals. To 
incorporate the impacts of crude oil prices, a supply-demand model of corn ethanol is 
required.  
Irrespective of the asset type (financial or physical assets), reliable models are 
necessary to explain the pricing patterns (Brooks and Katsaris, 2003; Hassan and Suk-Yu, 
2007). The methods used to test for speculative bubbles in financial assets are not directly 
applicable to test for speculative investment in the physical assets such as ethanol plants, 
because the installed capacity did not rise and fall as it happened in financial asset or 
crude oil prices. In the context of physical assets such as corn ethanol plants, a supply-
demand model that can explain ethanol price expectations and tie those expectations with 
the installed capacity can prove useful. Consequently Muth’s rational expectations model 
on explaining price movements in commodities can serve as the required useful model in 
this analysis. 
Rational expectations theory is frequently associated with the identification of 
speculative behavior (Blanchard, 1979). Muth’s (1961) seminal paper on rational 
expectations and price movements deals with such a system for commodities. It also 
discusses how commodity markets can result in speculative behavior when storage is 
possible. To study possible speculative investment in ethanol industry, his model has to 
be used in conjunction with other procedures. These procedures include econometric 
testing for speculation using tests such as bubble premium tests, and cointegration tests 
(Brooks and Katsaris, 2003; Hassan and Suk-Yu, 2007). The bubble premium tests can be 
reinterpreted as the study of idled capacity in ethanol industry; the cointegration tests can 
be reinterpreted as the study of long run relationship between idled ethanol capacity and 
crude oil prices. Irrespective of the method, Muth’s model remains fundamental to all 
types of testing conducted in this study. 
Muth’s model presents a system of equations for commodity supply, demand, 
inventory changes and price movements predicted using rational expectations. The 
rational prices for the commodity is proved to be a second order difference equation (see 
equation (10) below). Sargent showed that solving such a second order difference equation 
introduced two new variables. (Flood and Garber, 1980) proposed that such variables and 
associated parameter estimates can provide information about the speculative behavior in 
pricing pattern; their illustration was based on testing for speculative behavior in money Draft – Do not quote   
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supply and inflation. Flood and Garber employed cross equation restrictions to estimate 
these new variables. This study employs similar restrictions in the context of Muth’s 
commodity pricing model applied to ethanol supply and demand systems. These 
restrictions are explained in detail in Sargent (1987). 
The methodological novelty of this study is that it combines the tests proposed by 
(Flood and Garber, 1980) with Muth’s model for commodity pricing pattern and test for 
speculation in corn ethanol investments. If the estimated coefficients associated with 
these variables are significant, then it may serve as an evidence for speculative 
investments in corn ethanol industry. This study uses multivariate GARCH estimation 
technique to estimate the system of ethanol supply-demand-inventory, to account for the 
heteroskedastic volatility in crude oil prices and ethanol prices. The econometric 
implementation of this procedure can be difficult because one of the new variables is 
explosive (i.e. its value approaches infinity over time) as a regressor. This problem is 
described below along with two alternative methods that can overcome the problem.  
The basic method adopted in this study uses a combination of approaches 
advanced in Muth (mathematical derivations in Sargent), and Flood and Garber. Starting 
with the system of demand-supply-inventory equations this study derives price 
expectations for ethanol based on rationality (or quasi-rationality). Sargent shows that 
such an equation introduces two new variables in the price expectations equation for 
ethanol. These two variables are λ1
t
 and λ2
t, where λ1 and λ 2 are roots of the characteristic 
equation associated with the second order difference equation; t indicates time period. As 
Muth states, one of the roots will be less than unity in value (p 326). Sargent shows that 
these roots will be real and inverse of each other (i.e. λ1 = 1/ λ2). Without loss of 
generality, assume that |λ1| <1 and |λ2| >1 with the associated parameters c1 and c2. As 
t￿∞, one root vanishes (c1λ1
t ￿ 0 as t ￿ ∞, since |λ1| <1) and the other root (c2λ2
t ￿ ∞ 
as t ￿ ∞, since |λ2| >1) approaches infinity. Muth restricts both c1 and c2 to zeroes to 
avoid any explosive behavior in price expectations. But, the Flood and Garber approach 
suggests that c2 may be estimated and tested for significance. Their method is 
implemented by including the two new variables [c1 λ1
t] and [c2 λ2
t]
 as part of the 
estimation procedure. As shown below, λ1 and λ2 are dependent on supply-demand 
system parameters and implemented as cross equation restrictions. If the estimated 
coefficient for c2 is statistically significant, then it is a probable evidence for speculative 
price expectation within ethanol industry which could have affected ethanol investments. 
The difficulty with this procedure is in estimating c2 reliably because λ2
t explodes over 
time. 
Alternative Methods: 
An alternative technique to overcome estimating c2 is to test the idled capacity of 
ethanol plants. Modeling the installed or idled capacity in conjunction with ethanol prices 
under rational expectations can provide a basis to test for speculative investment in corn 
ethanol plants. This is similar to testing for cointegration between idled capacity and 
ethanol (crude oil) prices. Another method that overcomes estimation problems is a slight 
variant of the basic method. First, the coefficients of new variables (c1 and c2) are 
suppressed to zero as done by Muth. Next, price expectations are estimated based purely 
on market fundamentals; omitting the possible speculation on ethanol prices. Finally, this 
price equation is used to predict the capacity that would have been supported by market 
fundamentals. Subtracting the predicted ethanol capacity from actual installed capacity Draft – Do not quote   
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defines the speculative component. The resultant series can then be tested for stationarity. 
If it is nonstationary or if there is a pattern that persists over time, it can be taken as an 
evidence for speculative behavior in corn ethanol industry. 
 
3. Model A 
 
The Muth’s model which is considered as basic is described below. The exposition 
closely follows Sargent (1987). 
 
Ethanol Demand:  
Let the demand for ethanol be 
(1) Ct = – β Pt + Dt 
 
Ct = monthly demand for corn ethanol at time t (million gallons) 
Pt = actual market price of ethanol ($/gallon) 
Dt = other factors that affect demand (growth in energy use, GDP, etc)  
β > 0 
 
There is an extra term Dt which is the only variation in this model compared to Sargent.  
 
Ethanol Supply:  
Let the supply for ethanol be 
 
(2) Yt = g Pt
 + Xt 
 
Yt = monthly supply of corn ethanol at time t (million gallons) 
Pt = price expectation of ethanol  
Xt = factors that affect supply (installed capacity, inputs, processing technology)  
 
Inventory:  
Let the inventory maintained for ethanol be 
 
(3) It = α (Pt+1 – Pt) 
 
It = Demand from inventory  
α > 0, depends on the variance of ethanol prices 
 
Market Clearing Condition: 
(4) Yt = Ct + (It – It-1) 
 
Substituting (1), (2) and (3) in (4) gives  
(5) g Pt + Xt = – β Pt + Dt + α (Pt+1 – Pt) – α (Pt – Pt-1) 
 
Muth assumed perfect foresight rational expectations, which yielded Pt = Pt (an alternate 
assumption could be to use quasi-rational expectations and replace Pt with a functional 
representation that includes Pt). Draft – Do not quote   
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Substituting  Pt = Pt in (5) 
(6) Xt – Dt = – β Pt + α (Pt+1 – Pt) – α (Pt – Pt-1) – g Pt 
  
Or 
(7) α Pt+1 – [(2α + β + g)] Pt + α Pt-1 = Xt – Dt  
 
Or 
(8) Pt+1 – f Pt + Pt-1 = (Xt – Dt) / α,     where f = (2α + β + g)/ α = (β + g)/ α + 2 
 
Stepping back by one period,  
(9) Pt – f Pt-1 + α Pt-2 = (Xt-1 – Dt-1) / α 
 
This is the second order difference equation: 
 
(10) (1 – f L + L
2) Pt = (Xt-1 – Dt-1) / α   where L = lag operator 
 
Factoring the polynomial in lags in LHS: 
 
(11) (1 – f L + L
2) = (1 – λ1L) (1 – λ2L) = 1 – (λ1 + λ2) L + λ1λ2 L
2 
 
Equating coefficients of (11) with (10), we get 
 
(12) (λ1 + λ2) = f = (β + g)/ α + 2 
 
(13) λ1λ2 = 1 ￿ λ1 = 1/λ2  
(note that if one root is less than unity, the other will be greater than unity) 
 
Substituting (13) in (10): 
(14) (1 – λ1L) (1 – λ2L) Pt = (Xt-1 – Dt-1) / α  
 
Or  
(15) Pt = [1/(α  (1 – λ1L) (1 – λ2L))] (Xt-1 – Dt-1) + c1 λ1
t + c2 λ2
t 
 
(16) Pt = α
-1 [(1 – λ1L) (1 – λ2L)]
-1 (Xt-1 – Dt-1) + c1 λ1
t + c2 λ2
t 
 
where c1 and c2 are two arbitrary constants. Without loss of generality, assume  |λ1| < 1 
and |λ2| > 1.If the coefficient c2 (corresponding to λ2) is statistically significant, then we 
may conclude that there was speculative behavior in ethanol industry. The lag terms in 
(15) are substituted with their standard expressions as following (See Sargent, page 199): 
 
Since λ1 ≠ λ2, the term [(1 – λ1L) (1 – λ2L)]
-1 in (16) can be replaced by the following term 
(Sargent, page 184) 
           1         λ1          –        λ2 
(17) [(1 – λ1L) (1 – λ2L)]
-1 = ------------          [ ---------            --------- ] 
        (λ1 – λ2)  (1- λ1L)  (1- λ2L) Draft – Do not quote   
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Substituting (17) in (16):  
 
(18) Pt  = α
-1 [1/(λ1 – λ2)] [λ1/(1- λ1L) – λ2/(1- λ2L)] (Xt-1 – Dt-1) + c1 λ1
t + c2 λ2
t 
 
= A + B + c1 λ1
t + c2 λ2
t  
 
Where A = [α
-1 λ1/(λ1 – λ2)] [1/(1- λ1L)] (Xt-1 – Dt-1)   
 
= [α
-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] i=1∑
∞ λ1





-1 λ2/(λ1 – λ2)] [1/(1- λ2L)] (Xt-1 – Dt-1)   
 
= [α
-1 λ2/(λ1 – λ2)] (– 1) [(λ2L)
-1/(1- λ2
-1L




-1/(λ1 – λ2)] [λ1L
-1/1- λ1L
-1] (Xt-1 – Dt-1) 
 
= – [α
-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] [L
-1/1- λ1L
-1] (Xt-1 – Dt-1) 
 
= – [α
-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] [1/1- λ1L
-1] (Xt – Dt) 
 
= – [α
-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] i=0∑
∞ λ1
i (Xt+i – Dt+i)   
 
Substituting the expressions for A and B in (18) 
 
Pt= [α
-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] i=1∑
∞ λ1
i (Xt-i – Dt-i) – (–1) [α
-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] i=0∑
∞ λ1
i (Xt+i – Dt+i) + c1 λ1




-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] i=1∑
∞ λ1
i (Xt-i – Dt-i) + [α
-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] i=0∑
∞ λ1
i (Xt+i – Dt+i) + c1 λ1




-1 /(λ1 – λ2)] i=-∞∑
∞ λ1
|i| (Xt-i – Dt-i) + c1 λ1
t + c2 λ2
t 
 
Flood and Garber (1981) suggested autoregressive processes (of Xt and Dt) to 
approximate the infinite summation in the above expression. This method could capture 
the economic ‘process’ that connects supply and demand parameters with the price 
expectation. The order of the autoregressive process is chosen based on the time series 
properties of Xt and Dt. Upon finalizing a functional form for the first term in the above 
expression, c2 (associated with |λ2| >1) can be estimated and if it is statistically 
significant, then we may conclude there was speculative production. The systems 
estimation procedure available with Eviews software can be used to estimate supply-
demand-inventory-price expectations equations. Since volatility clustering (a form of 
heteroskedasticity) prevalent in crude oil prices spills over to ethanol prices as well, the 
proposed systems estimation could be done using (multi-variate) GARCH estimation 
procedure. More importantly, the restrictions (13) and (19) are imposed as part of the 
estimation procedure.    Draft – Do not quote   
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λ1 + λ2 = λ + 1/λ = f 
i.e.   
λ
2 – f λ + 1 = 0 ￿ 
 
λ = [f - (√f
2-4)]/2 
OR 




(19) f = (β + g)/ α + 2 
 
Note that the roots λ1 and λ2 are dependent on parameters that affect supply and demand 
elasticities (α, β, g). This model helps analyze whether ethanol markets (demand and 
supply) can be fully explained using market fundamentals such as the prices of ethanol, 
crude oil and government mandates or is there some unexplained speculative behavior 
captured by c2. After estimation, prices can be forecast based on the estimated equation 
by suppressing c1 and c2 (i.e. price estimated after removing the speculative demand 
arising from inventory). Plugging the forecast price in the supply equation (2), we can 
predict what the supply (not the installed capacity) would have been in the absence of 
speculation. The impact of speculation on ethanol industry’s installed capacity can be 
included with the above system by including another equation that connects price 




Assume that Qt is the cumulative demand for corn ethanol plants (say, number of plants 
or name-plate capacity) at time t. Let it depend on the existing capacity (Qt-1) and future 
anticipated demand (denoted by the function F(Pt+1; Xt) where Pt+1 is the expected price of 
ethanol in period t+1) with the weights being θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. 
 
i.e.  
(B1)   Qt = θ Qt-1 + (1- θ) F(Pt+1; Xt);  
 
Rearranging using the lag operator: 
(B2) (1- θL) Qt = (1- θ) F(Pt+1; Xt)  
Or 
(B3) Qt = (1- θL)
-1 (1- θ) F(Pt+1; Xt) 
 
Let the supply of ethanol be  
(B4) St =   Qt + G(Pt) where   = average capacity utilization of corn ethanol plants and 
G(.) is the ethanol price expectation for period t.   varied from 0.73 to 0.93; if   > 1, 
then the ethanol plants are operated above the name-plate capacity.  
 
Substitute (B3) in (B4): 
(B5) St =   (1- θL)
-1 (1- θ) F(Pt+1; Xt) + G(Pt) Draft – Do not quote   
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Since, (1- θ) is constant in (B5), it can be written as: 
(B6) St =   (1- θ) (1- θL)
-1 F(Pt+1; Xt) + G(Pt) 
 
Under rational expectations model under perfect foresight to predict ethanol prices 
(similar to above model), this becomes  
(B7) St =   (1- θ) (1- θL)
-1 F(Pt+1; Xt) + G(Pt) 
 
Multiplying and dividing the first term in (B7) by [– (θ L)
-1]: 
 
St =   (1- θ) [– (θ L)
-1/– (θ L)
-1] (1- θL)
-1 F(Pt+1; Xt) + G(Pt) 
 
=   ((θ-1)/ θ) [1/(1- θ
-1L
-1)] [L
-1] F(Pt+1; Xt) + G(Pt) 
 
=   ((θ-1)/ θ) [1/(1- θ
-1L
-1)] F(Pt+2; Xt) + G(Pt) 
 
Since θ < 1, θ
-1 > 1, 
 
=   ((θ-1)/ θ) (-1) i=1∑
∞ θ
-i L
-i F(Pt+2; Xt) + G(Pt) + c3 θ
-t  
 
where c3 is an arbitrary constant; if c3 were statistically significant, then it would 
correspond to speculative production St; also note that θ
-t explodes as t￿ ∞, if 0 < θ < 1 
 
=   ((1-θ)/ θ) i=1∑
∞ θ
-i L
-i F(Pt+2; Xt) + G(Pt) + c3 θ
-t 
 
=   ((1-θ)/ θ) i=1∑
∞ θ
-i F(Pt+2-i; Xt-i) + G(Pt) + c3 θ
-t 
 
Although this is a forward-looking solution, it can be approximated using an auto-
regressive process of the function F(.) and factors that affect supply G(.), as suggested by 
Flood and Garber. 
 
Summary: 
Crude oil price speculation could have increased installed capacity in corn ethanol plants 
beyond what was warranted by the market factors. The above discussion proposed using 
Muth’s commodity pricing model and Flood and Garber’s tests to test for speculative 
investment in US corn ethanol industry. The ethanol prices predicted using rational 
expectations (perfect foresight) are used to differentiate the installed capacity into two: 
capacity supported by the market fundamentals and the capacity that is installed based on 
speculation. The econometric estimation procedures and functional form approximations 
discussed above will be implemented using monthly data from 1999-2009 to test for 
possible speculative behavior in ethanol industry. The empirical results are available with 
the authors.  
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